




















Provisi rn U~ PlrllllCSi11(~~S Will1 InC mpletf, InÍnrm~~:.ln'






This paper compares decenualization atid cenual plannin~ in tlie context of the
pruvisiun of public gouds with incomplete infoiYnation on tJie individual cost of
participation. Decenualization is represented by voluntary conu-ibutions whereby each
individual chooses whetJier and when to make his contribution. Central planning is
represented by a random selection of the prospective contributor. Assuming that the
political outconie in an ecunnmy is detennined by majority voting, it turns out that random
planninL frequently emcrges as the preferable allocation mode, and is especially
,~dvanta~eous in large groups, or ~~ hen public derision is valuable or ur~ent.2
I. Introclncti~
Public goocis is a typi~al exampte of market failure that has served as an argument for
government intetvention since the writinp.s of lohn Stuart Mill. Many economists have
bcen yuick to recognize the limits of governnient intetvention and the correspondin~ causes
of "intervention failure". Pollowing the insights provided by the public choice literature, it
is now conunonly a~reed that any plausible model of the govetnuient should focus on the
positive aspects and incorporate real life elements which may be detrimental for
governrnent intervention. Indeed, some public goods are provided by private individuals
and voluntary organizations (e.g., charity clonations) whereas provision of others is usually
done by governrnents (e.g., national riefence). One of the factors likely to cause failure of
centralized intervention is inconrplete infomiation on the part of the central authority; it is
reflected in the popular statement that the consumer knows what is best for him better than
the governnient official does.
In this paper, I assnme th;u both dccenn~alization and government intetvention involve
incompletc infonnation ancl compare the welfare perfonnance of thcse allocation methods.
I consider a gruup of indivicluals contemplating the provision of a public f;ood. The
production function of this good is exuemely simple: the good is provided if and only if at
least one indiviciual contributes towards its provision. At the sanie tirne, the contributors
incur a cost which is private infomiation. The issue at hand is to efficiently coordinate the
individuals' actions- Efficiency here implies that the pubtic good should be provided by
the lowest cost individual if and only if that individual's cost is lower than the ~roup's
benefit from the public goo~l; otherwise, the public good should not be provided.t
Decentralization is represented by voluntary conu~ibutions whereby each individual
chooses, independently of the others. whether and when to make his conu ibution. The
outcome of this ga,ne is represented by a symmeu~ic Bayesian-Nush equilibrium.3
Central planning is represenied in the model by a(probably imperfect) rule which
~ selects the prospective conuibutor at random. In particular, an iniplicit assumption hidiien
in my approach is that for various reasons (transaction costs, for example) the planner is
unable to elicit cost inform;ttion from the individuals. This precludes optimal mechanism
design as well as the facility to conduct tests for assessing the individual's personal uaits
and abilities.' Another assumption macle implicitly in this paper, which is consistent with
must of the public finance literature, is that the pl;rnner is benevolent in the sense of
faithfully representin~ the indivictuals' interests. A more realistic approach would model
the planner as one who has vested interests which are remote from those of the public, as is
done in the public choice lirerature.;
The results indicate that planning is freyuently preferred to decentralization by a vast
majority of individuals, which may explain why hierarchical organizational st,~ucture
characterizecl by at least some exercize of (possibly incompetent) authority, is so
widespread even in democr:uic societies. According to this paper, such structures are
especially advantageous in large groups or when the public decision is valuable. In
contrast, decentralization performs rclatively better in sm;ill groups, for relatively
unimportant public decisions. This may explain the prevalence of volunt:uy fonns of
organization (e.g., the family unit, agricultural cooperatives, etc.) in small groups.
Analysis of the dynamic version of the paper indicates that the urgency of the public
decision can also have importance: the more urgent the problem, the more likely is pla,ming
to emerge as a viable politirtl outcome. This may help to explain why public decision
making tends to become more centralized in emergency situations. lndeed, during both
World War I and ~ti'orld War II decentralization was supplanted by government planning as
a major coordinating mechanism (see Pigou, 1941, and Devons, 1)5O, for evidence of
this). The scope of the government discretionary decision is widened not only during
wartime but dtn~ing economic crises as well as is evident from the US history dw-ing the
Great Depression.4
This stuciy is related tu the work on organization design in which the importance of
incomplete inforniation has heen recognized - see e.g., Arrow, 1984, Sah, 1991. Ledyard
ancl Palfrey, 199(l, provide characterization of efficient mechanisnu in a similar but
different context and show that under a variety of circumstances random allocation is
optímal. Palfrey and Rosenthal, l IRR, 1991, consider a model which corresponds to the
static version of decenualized decision making of this paper; Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984, and
Veba-Redoncfu, 199(l, focus on the ciynamic version of the model, but neither author
purpons to make a welfare cotnparisrni that is presented here. This paper is close in spirit
to the work of Bolton and Fanell, 1990, which is concerned with a comparison between
decentralizatiun and central planning, albcit in a different economic context. A recent study
Gradstein, 19i)2, also contains some preliminary discussion of this issue. The major focus
of this contribution as upposed to the previous two is on majority voting as the actual
detennin:rnt o( political outcomes in an econumy.
2. Analvsis of the ~t~ttic ~~aee
A The niodel
Consieier n inciividuals who conteniplate the provision of a public goud. Technoloby
is such that the contribution of a single intlividual is sufficient in order for the public ~ood
be provided. The value of the public Food for each indivídual is a known constant s,
se (0, I]. The private cost associated with individual i's p.u~ticipation in the provision of the
public good is c~.a lt is asswned that each individual knows his own c,, but only has
incomplete infunnation as to the other individuals' costs. More precisely, from individual
i's viewpoint other individuals' costs are independent random variables, each of which is
disvibuted accurclin~ to [he unifonn probability disu ibution funetion over the unit interval.5
Each inelividual's utility is given by thc sum total of the value of the public good and the
altlonnt Of pl"R':rte consumption.c'I compare performance of the folluwinfi two alternative allocation procedures in the
simple public decision context given above.
Procedure A A decennalizerl procedure in which each individual's strategy is whether or
not to contribute as a function of his type. If (and only if) at least one individual
volunteers to conuibute then the public good is provided, the volunteers incurring the
cost of its provision. This yields a game of incomplete infonnation among the
individuals. I3ayesian-Nash equilihrium constitutes the solution concept for this
game.~
Procedure B Irnperfect central planning in which allocation is implemented randomly
under the veil oC ignorance. More precisely, under the second procedure the planner is
assumed to implement the allocalion, in particul~tr, to nominate the pvtential contributor
randonily such that the probabilit~- of each individual to be selected for the task is p~n .
Thus, the probability that the public Food will be provided is p, where p is chosen by
the planner so as to maxin~ize his expccte~i utility.
The main results presented below reniain unchanged under different modifications of the
above model. One modification is to require contributions of several individuals for the
provision of a public good. This vercion turns out to be less tractalile, but yiel~ls analogous
results. Another, even more interesting nwdification - analysis of which is presented in the
appendix - is to randomly select the conuibutor(s) in the case of an excessive number o(
volunteets. Again, the conclusions are similar to those of the simplifiecl version.
[3. Utilitv levels under the two procedures
In this section I cierive utility levels obtainable under the two alternative allocation
procedures in oreler to compare their perfomtance.
Pmcedure A In this case consider synunetric [3ayesian-Nash equilibria of the
following type: conu ibute iff c~ ~ c~`. The cutoff value c~ is given by
s-c~` -s-s(I-c~`)r~-t (1)6
"This value expresses indifference of the boundary individual type, c~`, between the two
possible actions. Individual i's utility is then as follows (see also Figure 1):
s- ci if ci ~ ci:
-l
s-~(I -c~)'~ t ifci?c~`
Ur~~s~t Fèv~vrs l ~Hl~e~e
(2)
Some properties of the eyuilihrium are suntni,u'ized below.
(.emma 1
(i) Equilibtium exists, is tmique, and is characterized by a cutoff c~ ? sl~ 1 t s(n-I )~;
(ii) "i~he cutuff point c~` is an increasing function of s and a decreasing fiuiction of n;
(iii) c~` tencls to 0 as n tends to infinity, or as s tends to 0.
(All the proofs are relegated to the appendix.)
It is worth noting for the subsccluent analysis that the eyuilibrium is inefficient. In
panicular, it may yielcl either insufficient or excessive conuibutions relative to the
social optinnim.
Procedure I3. In this case, it i~ assumed that the planner acts as the maximizer of the
expected utilitarian social welfare function, hence he chooses p in order to maximize EuR - i
E(s - c~ln)p -(s - ll2n)p, where u~ is individiwl i's utility.
The maximizine value of p is 0 if ns ~(l2 and 1 otherwise, the inteipretation being that the
planner provicles the public good only if its social value (ns) exceeds its expected cost
( ll2). Substitutine this back into the individual utility function, 1 obtain
O f
(3)
s- c,~n if ns ? ll2
Under the assumptions made the above procedure is ex ante individually rational,7
that is, it ensures each individual nun-negative expected utility. fn ex pust tenns,
however, the procedure does not guarantee each individual a twn-negative utility level.
Thus, its implemen[ation hinges on some sort of binding contract between the planner and
the individuals which would force the individual chosen to be a contributur to make his
contribution.
C. Welfare comparition~etween the tw proceduree
From the analysis of the previous section, it fulluws that the welfare diffctential
between prucedures A and B, Du, is
Max (s - s(1- c~` )~~-i, s- c;] if ns ~ 1~2
~~u-uA -uA- i i
tilax~s-s(1-c")"-i,s-c;J-(s-c;~n) ifns?ll2
It is clear that as long as ns ~ 1~2, decentralization is a superior procedure from the
stan~lpoin[ of ever}~ individual since in this case the planner always chooses not to provide
the public Eoud. The rest of the paper concentrates, therefore, on the case where ns ? l~2.
The followinp tliagram illusuates the corresponding utility levels uA and u~ in this case. i t
l~,s~PQ i"i~ur~ 2 :f'1~~~
It is c(ear from the diagram that A is preferred to B only by those indiviciuals for whom
c, ~ c. It is also yuite straightfonvard tu calculate the cutoff point making the welfare
ciifferential, Au, eyual (l: c' - ns(1 - c~`)~'-t - nc'k, that is, the cutoff point eyuals the
expected numbe:r of conuibuturs under the decent,alized procedure.
The next propusition deals with the relative attractiveness of the tw~o prucedures as a
function of the parameters.
Proposition 1. Tlte Ltrper is the population is and the larger is s, the larper is the proportion
of individuals who prefer random planning to decenualization. In particular, for
sufficiently small values of s, decenualization is almost unanimously preferred to randomplanning, whcreas for sufficiently large values of n, random planning is almost
unanimously prefened to decentralization.
"['he intuition behind tlte compa,ative statics result with respe~t to n is that as n
increases, the plannerchooses to pruvide the public good with probability I because of its
high value tu thc inciiviciuals. Thus, althuugh as n inereases it becomes more clifficult to
numinate the right person as a contributur, the public good will be provided and, indeecl,
with an increase in pupulatiun, the social value of this clecision increases. On the other
hand, decentralization perfot7ns poorl}~ in economies with a large population because of the
increased likelihood of excessive contributions. "T'herefore, large populations are favorable
for random planning. The intuition behinci the result dealing with the change in s is that as
s increases, the social value of the public goocl increases faster than its value for a single
individual, hence the more valuable the public good, the better random planning performs
relative to ciccentralization.
Another interesting issue is to compare the utilitarian social welfare functions in the
two cases. Graphically, these are given by the corresponding areas uncler the u~ and u~ i ,
curves in ~igure 2, that is,
w'~ -~t (s-c)c1c f j~; (s - s(1- c~ )~~ t ~dc - s- c~ t c~`' -~2
Wrr - J~ (s-c~n)dc - s - ll2n
anc1, thcrefore,
~w - wA - wH - I(c`-1)'- - 1 t l~n~l2
w-hich is positive fur ct ~ 1-( I-lln)tr and negative otherwise. Recalling that
(5)
c - nc~`, it
can be seen that from the standpoint of social welfa,.e maxirTUZation, decentralization is
preferable if anci only if c ~ nl (-( I- Iln)t~' -J. Since this allocation mode wins the political
support of a m;tjority when c ~ 1~2 ~ n(1 -(I-I~n)u?), it may happen that ciecentralization,
while being socially optimal, is clefeated in a political process. Because n(1 -(1-l~n)tn]
tends to 1~? as n tends to intinity, the likelihood of the majority voting to produce a sociallysuboptimal outcome is diminished in larpe populations. (lence, we have the following
result
I-enuna 2. The pulitical outcome is not necessa,ily socially optimal; in particular,
whenever 1~2 ~ c ~ n~ l-( 1-l~n)~r), a majority of individuals prefer a socially inferior
mo~1e of randurn planning. When n is large, this suboptimality txcomes unlikelv.g
As an illustratiun of the above, consieler Table 1 which presents numerical tabulation
of the cuto(f p~,int c and of 4w for selected values of n and s.
U~a~e~ J'afl'fiH~t 1 :fil~rs
Table 1 vividly shows that even for relatively small values of the parameters, random
planning perfonns impressively welL In p~rticular, it is typically the case that ~t majority of
individual~ in this example prefer randorn planning to decenualization.`~
In an appendix f present analysis of a hybrid between decentralization and random
planning ~tihich eliminates the problem of excessive contl-ibutions. The modified procedure
represents sunie improvement over the pure decenualizatiun studie~i above. It is important
to note, however, that once apain, in many cases random planning will constitute the actual
political outconie uniier majorily votin~.
3. 'rime d namics
This seetiun introduces time dynamic s into the static model described above. ~1ore
precisely, it is assumed that decentralization may involve delay, while cenualized decision
is implementetl immediately.ro For simplicity, individuals are asstmied to plan their
contribution decisions over a time horizon which consists of only two periods. The nature
of the dynamic decentralized procedure (refened to as AD) is such that if tlte public good is
provided during the first period, then no second period contributions are made. Otherwise,
individuals may continue to contemplate making contributions. Let x' denote individual i's
decision in period t, x' - 1 the decision to conu ibute, and x' -O the decision to refrain fromI O
making a conlribution. Furthermore, if at least one of the individuals decides to conuibute
in period one, then necessarily x' - 0, i- 1,...,n (it is assumed that past actions ve ~
perfeciJy obtiervable). As previously, inelivicluals decide on their actions as a funetion of
their type. In acidition, an individual's second period action can be conclitioned on the tirst
period actions ancl each ineli~~idual's second period beliefs are updateei in the Bayesian
manner. Individu~ls act so as to maximize the discounted sum of their utilities, S, 0 ~ S ~
l being the conunon discount rate. Tlie remainder of the model, whose present structure is
of the war of ~tu ition type, is exactly as in Section 2. i am intcrested in the symmetric
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting ~ame. The following proposition
characterizes that eyuilibrium.
Proposition ~. Equilibrium is characterized by cutoff points (c~, c~), such that if c; ~ c~ ,
incíividual i should conuibute in period i; if ci~ c; ~ e~, individual i should contribute in
period 2 unless the public good had been provided in period l; and, finally, if c; ~ c~,
individual i does not h;tve to make a contribution .u all. The beliefs in period 2 are a
u-uncation o( tlie first period beliefs. ~ t
(n eyuilibrium time then acts as a revelation mechanism by sor~ting out individu;tls
according to their costs. An explicit characterization of the cutoff points is provided by
back~tia,ds induction argumentation. The following eyuation expresses indifference of the
boundary type c~ between conu~ibuting in period 2 and not contributing at all:
s-c~-s-sl(1 -c;)I(1 -c~))~, t
(A)
This eyuation yields c~ as a function of ci, more precisely, an increasing function. Then
~~e have an eyu;uion which expresses indifference of the boundary type ci between
conuibuting in period 1 and postponing his conuibution decision:
s-ci-s-s(l-ci)"ttS(I-c~)"tM;txls-c~,s-s((i-c~)Itl-c~))"tl
(y)~rom the last eyuation ci is detennineci. Takcn together, the above two eyuations fully
characterize the eyuilibrium cutoff points. It can be shown that the solution of (8) and (9),
hence eyuilibrium, exists and is uniyue. Comparative statics analysis reveals that both
cutoff points increase in s and decrease in S, which itnplies that both the proporYion of the
first period contributors and the proportion of the seconci perioel contributors increase in the
value of the public pooel and clecrease in the ciiscount factor. !t may be interesting to
compare intuitively the basic procedure A wilh its dynamic analog AD. An obvious
disadvantape of AU rel;nive to A is possible inefficient clelay in the provision of the public
good. On the other h;ind AD perfonns a better selection of the conu ibuting individuals by
decreasing the probability of excessive conuibutions in period 1(it can be shown that ci ~ ~
c~). Thus, the more patient individuals are, the more likely AD is to outperfunn A, and
vice versa for impatient individuals.t'-
Assumin~ that n- 2 and s? 1~2, thr expectecl utility of an incliviciual type c; uncier
clrcenualization, u~t~, is as follows: ~
s~ c~ if c, ~ c~
u-~t~ - { s- sl I- c~) } S(s - c;)ll - c~) il c~~ c~ ~ c, (10)
s-s(I -c~)tS(1 -c~)(s-c;) if c;~c~ - ,
Since, with the assumptions macle, the planner chooses to provide the public good, the
expected utility of type r, uncier central planning, uR, eyuals s- c;~2. It is not difficult to ~
establish that the welfare comparison lxtween the two allocation methocls in this case
hinges on a cutoff value ca, such that an indiviclual prefers random planning if and only if
his cost is less than c" Ísee Figure 3). Furthermore, it can be shown that this value is an
increasing function of s ancl a decreasinb function of S.
laisprt .F~g~arp ,fi ~l~jP
Table Z provides numerical tabulation of the cutoff point cc~ for selected values of the
parameters s and S. This table clearly shows tliat when individuals a,~e patient enough (that12
is, when S is sufficiently largej, the niajority of individu~ls preferdecenualization to
ranilom planning.
~nacri ~~a9~9~. ~ Filyrs
This i, yuite intuitive since when individuals al~e patient, the clelay factor, which is a
disadvantage of ,AD, becomes less important, anc! we are left with the advantage of
prociucing a beuer selection of contributing inciividuals. Naturally, when incliviciuals are
impatient, then ran~ium pl:urning pcrfonns much better (in tenns of tlie proportion of
individuals whu prefer this proceclure) than AD. T'his suggests that plannin~ is expecteci to
erner~e as a viable political outcome in emergency situations where public clecisions are
urgent, such as ciuring wartime or econoinic crises.t~
~1. Concluriin~ rcnrirks
'rhis paper attempts to make a funher contribulion to the ciebate regareiing the
comparison bet~tieen decentralization anil intervention in the provision of public goo~ls.
The presented mocfel eluciclates some of the factots which are signiCcant for this issue.
Under conclitions of incrnnplete infrnineuion, both ciecentralization and central planninfi, as
they are nwciellcel in this paper, are iinperfrct resornce allocation procedtnes, and the
conip:u ison tkt~~een the t"o hinges on the p:uameters of the mo~fel, such as the value of
the public ~lecisiun at stake, the size of the group of inclividuals, the urgency of the public
decision and othcrs. Specificity of the model prevents us from making general conclusions
as to the effect of tliese factors. Casual enrpiricism, however, suppurts the view that in
nr.tny examples of public ciecision makinp, some of which tue provirkei in the Introciuction,
these factors arc inrieed important.Proof of lemnrt I. Consider
c - s(I- c)n-I (1')
Recall tliat c v;u ies in the unit intetval. Since the left-hand sicle in ( I') increases in c
anil the rieht-hanei sicle decreases ( both continuously), the intersection benti~een the two
exists ancl is uniyue. Since s(1- c)"-I ? s] I -( n- I)c)], it follo~~~s that c~k ? s~] I t s(n- I1].
r~c~` (I-c~~)n-I c~c~ s(1-c~)" I In(1-c~)
~s - --- ~ n i~O, anil Jn - r n.2
~O. 1 t s(n 1)(]-c ) I t s(n-I)(1-c )
As n tends to infinity, or s tends to 0, the right-hand side in (I') -- hence c~ - tends to 0.
Proof of Propotiition 1. The proof focuses on the behavior of nc~ as the parameters n and
s chan~e.
r)(nc~) c~c~
~s - n-~s ~ U. furthennore, since c" tenils to O as s diminishes to 0, so cloes nc~`.
~(nc~`)- ~, c~c~ ~ s(1-c~)"-I In(1-c'k) ~ c~` In(l-c~~`) ~n - c t n~n - c t n ~ n 2- c t n 1 f(n-1 )c~`I( I-c~) ~ the si~n of I t s(n-1)(1-c )
which is the saine as the sign of (I-2c}) f n]c~ t(I-c'k)In(l-c~)]. c~ attains its maximum
when s-1 and n-2 (see Ienuna 1), in which case it eyuals lïL. The bracketecl expression
abo~~e increases in cy anci there(óre attains its minimum at c~`~), in which case it eyuals O.
I lence ( I-Zc~) t n]c'' t( I-c~)In(1-c~)I ~O, which pro~-es that nc~` increases in n.
Since c~ ? s~] 1 t s(n-11] aitd nc~` inaeases in n, it follows that the limit of nc~ is greater
than nsl~ 1 t sln I)], which can be macle arbitrarily close to 1.A hvbrid of clecentrtliruion ~rnd rand m Planning
In this appendix i briefly consider the following combination of thc two proceciures
consicfered in section 2(Procedure tl). Suppose that individuals volunteer to make
contributions 'fhen tlie planner enters the stage by choosing the conu ibutor randonily if
and only if there is an excessive number of volunteers (that is, if this number exceeds 1).
Tiris modification, therefore, eliminates one of tlre possible ineffíciencies uf
decentralizaticin, namely, excessive contributions. Once again, we are interested in the
equilibrium su:rtegy which is characterized by a cutoff point c~~` as follows: volunteer if
and only if your cost is below c~`~`. If individual i decides to volunteer, then the public
good ís certainly provided. This indivicfual's expected cost, however, is less than c since
he is effectively chosen as a contributor with probability II(jfl), stihere j is the number of
individuals other than individual i whose cost is below c~~. Individual i's expected utility
therefore is s- c, E( II(jtl)), ~tihich after some manipulations yields
s-c,~1 -(1 -ck~)~~~Inc~k (II)
If inclividual i dccicl~s not to volunteer, thcn hi, e.rpecred utility is
s~l -II -c~:~:)~~ i~
(12)
Since the bound:uy type, c}'' should bc~ inclifferent between Uie two :r~tir~ns :tvailable to
hini, we have the f~,llowing eyuilibrium conclition:
S -C~~~~~ I - ( I - C~uv:tn~InC~~-S~1 ' (I -C~`t:)n I~
(13)
Denote by ut~ an individu:rl's utility under tlie modified procedure. '1'he cunip:rrative statics
analysis of Ihc e(frcts ol changes in s and n on c"~ and utt yields resul[s which are virtually
identic~l to those of lenmia l, and I will not rciterate them. Furthennore, since
s- c~~ 1-( I- c~)~'~Inc~ ~ s- c~, it follows that c~~ ~ c~` and that uH ? uA for any
c; ~O, that is the modifieci procedure outperforms pure decentralization.IS
As in the ~reviuus section, when ns ? 1~2 the comparison between moclified
clecenualization and ranclom planning hinges on ;t cutoff value c, such that iniliviclual i




I'ro~osition I' constitutes nn analog of Pro~osiliun I, an~l its proof piocccils ~iniilarly.
Prnpn~itiun 1' 'l he pro~ortion uf indivi~luals who prefer r:tndom ~lannin~ tu nioclifiecl
iieccnualizatirln is ;,n increasing function of hoth n and s.
D~Wts3 "fnï~~~ 3 ;F~sa~
Qualitativcl}, therefure, the results in this case are very similar to tliose of rure
derentralization, yuantitatively, howe~er, the results cliffer. A brief glance at Table 3 will
con~-ince the rea~ler that, depending on the p;uameter values, the modification may
significantly improve the performance of the decentraliud procedw~e. G~~en tlie moiiifíed
procrclure, howcver, is usually inferior to r:uxiom pLinning from ihe stanclpoint of a
majority of ín~i~ ieluaLti. It is only for very sniall values of parameters n anil s that the
moilifiecl proeeilure is preferreel tu rafl(10111 I)IaIIIIIII~? ~)' :1 I71:110f1tY. T IlU5, a combination of
decenualization ~cith corrective ranclom pl,tnning is more attractive th~n decenualization
~tlone and sometimes (especially for small groups and For not very valuable public
decisions) outperforms random planning. The latter emerges, however, once again, as a
potent resource allocation niethod.Ib
rooTNO~~c~
I. Robustne~s of the resulis with respect to some of the assuntptions is cliscussecl beluw.
2. Admitteclly, vie~sinp, the planner as bcin~ completely uninfomted is inappropríate in many circuntstances, however this modelling captures the idea that the planner is freyuently recluirecl to make decisions when he lacks all ;ulequate infonnation.
3. See Graclstein, 1cJc)3, for one attempt in this direction; results obtained under this altemative ;tpproach rend to favor the planner less than those obtained in this study.
4. It may be u.ticful to think of contributions in temis o( effort (as they are in the case of the military draft, for ex;t,nplej, rather than financial conu~ibutions.
S. Many of thc results remain unchanged for a general probability disuibution, so that this assumption is adoptecl mainly for notatiunal sintplicity.
6. Similar variations of this majel have been considered in Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984, Pulfrey and Ro,enth,cl, 1988, 1c~91, VeEa-Redondo. 1990.
7. See Bolton and farrell, 1990, for tuure detailed arguments justífying this approach.
8. Note that even ~~ hen n is small, the range of values of c for which the political outcome is suboptintal is relatively narrow; for instance, when n- 2, this range is (0.5, Qb).
9. Note that since c~? s~~ 1 t s(n-1)~, nc~ ~ 1~2 (that is, the majority is in favor of the random plannine), whenevcr n~(1-s)~s. In particular, this holds true when ns ~ I, that is, when the planner's decision to provide the public ~ood is socially optirnal for all possible configuratiuns of inclividual costs.
10. Although the moelcl contains ntany naive assuntptions, uadeoffs simil;u to those
indicated below c~ist in allern;uive versions as ~~ell - sce Gradstein, I c)~)2, for an exantple.
1 I. "the proof is st;tnd:trd and can be derivecl by writing down the incentive contpatibility consuaints; see belu~~ ~~here [he eyuilibriuin is explicitly derived.
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